WE ARE THE
TITANIC
Analysis
By
Jay
B Gaskill
“In part, what would happen in the wake of a
Greek default would depend on whether European leaders could create a firewall* to control the damage from
spreading widely-”.
Greece Nears the Precipice, Raising Fear, New York Times 9-20-12
*Hint- There is
no firewall. Read on….
SINKING THE TITANIC … AGAIN
The Unintentional Conspiracy That Almost Destroyed
American Banking And May Yet Do More Damage…
CARELESS CONSERVATIVES & CLUELESS LIBERALS
The
essence of the traditional conservative project is the preservation of
boundaries - social, political and economic; and the essence of the liberal
project is to seek the elimination or amelioration of the same boundaries. Both
seek the improvement of the human condition – but conservatives lean towards
less tinkering and more evolution, while liberals favor more social and
economic engineering; liberals usually, but not always have less concern for
the boundaries between private and government action. History is full of
examples in which each of these approaches has worked better than the other one…for
a time.
Now
let’s turn to the banking mess, where invisible boundaries are crossed all the
time, often with damaging consequences. In the financial world there are several
such boundaries: between borrowing and owning, for example, between
consequential failure and subsidized failure, and between high risk and low
risk banking operations.
THE TITANIC AND THE CONTAINMENT OF FAILURE
The
design of the Titanic included below-deck watertight compartments; these were
steel walls designed to contain flooding so that the entire ship could escape
capsizing as long as any leak was confined, leaving enough undamaged
compartments to provide net positive buoyancy. The concept was sound, though
poorly executed using the technology of the day. The practice is now standard
in the large vessel shipping industry using improvements in design and
execution such that large vessels almost never capsize anymore.
THE FALSE FIREWALL OF EUROPE
Greece
is only the first and most visible of the EU’s basket-case economies. The firewall reference in the opening quote
from the New York Times betrays a fundamental misconception about the very
concept. There was no firewall between
the European economy and the Greek economy.
What the author apparently means by the term is a bailout in the form of
a capital infusion as an emergency substitute for the lack of a firewall.
As in the Titanic, a firewall – or sealed watertight compartment – is to avoid
having a bailout. As the Titanic taught
us, bailouts sometimes cannot work. A
robust Greek firewall would have either prevented the Greek government from
misusing European borrowing power to run up an irredeemable level of
indebtedness or insulated the other EU members from the damage to the common
currency.
THE NO-FIREWALL BANKING EXPERIMENT
There
once was a working failure-containment strategy that allowed commercial banking
to weather the storms that periodically buffet the investment side. The strategy, partly cultural and partly
regulatory, had two key elements: (1) keeping a sufficient number of separate
banking institutions so that several failures among them would not bring down
the entire system – or stress the FDIC guarantees past the breaking point; (2)
maintaining a robust wall between high risk investment banking operations and
the conservative banking services used by the day-today consumer and business
depositors.
We
are still suffering through the ripple effects of the 2008-9 US banking crisis
(the scope and severity of which cannot be overstated). That crisis was a direct result of operational
and organizational changes in the finance industry during the last 15 years.
Over those years, propelled by the “dot com” bubble and other high profit lures,
investment banking institutions began ramping up profits by taking greater
risks, ultimately trading in bundled mortgage-secured debt instruments to
create the illusion of financial soundness. These instruments were, in fact,
faux assets that had been leveraged as much as 50-1 then used to pad the
balance sheets of a number of major financial institutions, to support more
risk-taking.
Then,
in a breathtaking change of policy, American commercial banking systems simply
abandoned protective compartments and firewalls altogether. Speculation in bundled mortgage debt
packages, shot through with negative value assets, was allowed to contaminate
traditional banking services. But during the banking crisis, Canadian banks and
the more conservative commercial banks, like US Bank, were largely
unaffected. Those few conservative,
traditional banks were like a handful of immunized families during the black
plague.
The
failure of America’s mainline banking institutions to honor the boundaries that
would contain bank speculation-engendered failures was a failed experiment
with liberalism enthusiastically embraced by conservatives. Among the many, otherwise intelligent
conservative voices, the scholars and analysts of the Heritage Foundation and
the American Enterprise Institute joined with the liberal Brookings Institute
in praising the change. Consumer bank
fees were reduced, American banks became more “world competitive”. It was a win-win for conservatives and
liberals alike. Or was it?
As
a research fellow from the Heritage Foundation recently wrote, “Prohibiting
banks from engaging in certain types of financial activities is an old and
discredited concept that was once embodied in the Glass–Steagall
Act of 1933. Before its repeal in 1999, Glass–Steagall
limited banks’ ability to meet the needs of their best customers as new,
cheaper financing products developed that were outside the scope of their
allowed activities. Some banks were weakened through their inability to compete
with other types of financial institutions, while eventually other banks found
ways around those restrictions.
“…[attempts
via] misguided legislation to reestablish the Glass–Steagall
Act assume that a bank should be essentially a utility limited to taking in
deposits and making certain types of safe loans. They reason that if banks are
protected from risky activities, other types of financial services firms can be
allowed to fail without causing problems to the overall financial system.
However, these proposals completely miss the point that as far back as the 1998
failure of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, systemic risk to the
financial system is less likely to come from banks than from non-banks.
By
David C. John, Senior Research Fellow in Retirement Security and Financial
Institutions in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The
Heritage Foundation.
Heritage
Foundation Web Memo No. 2810, February 22, 2010
That
piece spoke for the conservative establishment.
Background: The Banking Act of 1933 that first
established the FDIC and inaugurated depression era banking reforms, was
also known as the Glass–Steagall Act.
Among other things, it barred any bank holding company from owning other
financial companies. These and other
firewall protections of commercial banking were repealed in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. This
one measure took down the wall between investment banks that issued
securities and the commercial banks (classic deposits and loan). And it
repealed conflict of interest restrictions on investment bankers who
simultaneously served as commercial bank officers.
It
was a bipartisan orgy - liberals and conservatives banding together in the
heady days of the dot com boom to erase some pesky, antiquated, profit-impairing
boundaries. The House passed the first
version the act 343-86 when republicans rolled a few nay-saying conservatives
and most democrats. But the democrats jumped on board when the
House voted 241-132 (most republicans opposing, most democrats supporting) to
instruct negotiators to insert provisions against redlining. You may recall that redlining
is what liberals called the practice of mortgage lenders who used strict
borrower-criteria in poor (read minority) neighborhoods, based on the quaint
notion that anyone would ever have to actually pay back a mortgage loan!
The
final bill incorporated strong anti-redlining provisions. It passed the Senate 90-8, and by the
House 362-57, and was signed into law by President Clinton in late 1999.
As
it turned out, this would be a key ingredient in a toxic stew. The anti-redlining provisions led to political
pressure on mortgage lenders, Fanny May
and Freddy Mack (The Federal National
Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Mortgage Corporation) to make more and
more questionable loans. This led to a
cultural watershed: The practice of making loans that depended on the
expectation of appreciation instead of the borrower’s actual ability to repay
the borrowed money became the norm. Thus
the seedbed for the real estate lending bubble that would dominate the 90’s and
the first eight years of the 21st century was planted, watered and fertilized.
We
had been warned. Three years earlier, in
1996, Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan had given a famous speech before the
American Enterprise Institute (recall this was during the height of the dot com
bubble) in which he asked “How do we know
when irrational exuberance has
unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and
prolonged contractions?” The final answer
would come in with a shock in late 2008.
The
recession that immediately followed the dot com bubble became dramatically
worse in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9-11-01. But the real estate
speculation bubble was able to fill the void, replacing the dot com froth with
toxic asset fizz. American investment
banks jumped into the risk pond and frolicked for seven years in a state of
uncritical, irrational exuberance. When
the inevitable banking collapse finally took place in 2008, the damage could
not be confined to a few, compartmentalized risk-takers. The “toxic asset” problem (really faux
assets, un-payable loans on overvalued properties – leveraged by a factor or
50-1 in some instances) had infected Wells
Fargo, Citibank, Chase, Bank of America and hundreds of other major banks, including
their day-to-day main street commercial operations.
But
not all banks were among the hundreds receiving bailout money in 2008 and 2009.
Worldwide Financial Crisis Largely Bypasses Canada
“Canadian
banks have not gone shaky like their American counterparts, economists and
other experts said. There is no subprime mortgage or home foreclosure mess. And
while the United States fears a prolonged recession, Canadians have remained
relatively sanguine…”
“Strict
rules also govern mortgage lending. By Canadian law, any mortgage that will
finance more than 80 percent of the price of a home must be insured. Two-thirds
of all Canadian mortgages are insured by the quasi-governmental Canadian
Mortgage and Housing Corp. As a result of the tough standards for insurance, ‘people
tend not to get mortgages they cannot afford,’ Gregory said.
“’Defaulting
on a loan is also more difficult in Canada than the United States, Gregory
said. ‘You can't just drop off the keys and walk away.’
“For
Canada’s seven biggest banks, the percentage of mortgages at least three months
in arrears was 0.27 percent in July, close to historic lows, according to the
banking association. Also, few Canadian banks got caught holding large numbers
of toxic American mortgages.
“Amid
this relative health, there have been reports that American companies, needing
cash and credit, have been turning to their Canadian subsidiaries for
short-term loans.”
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/15/AR2008101503321.html
.
CNN
Money
published the initial bailout list of US Banks – there were hundreds - http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/bankbailout/
.
LESSONS
Old
fashioned conservatism and sane liberalism tend to respect the essential
boundaries on which day-to-day commerce depends. Those are simple boundaries, such
as those between assets and liabilities, between secure loans and speculation -
the boundaries that ensure reasonable safety and dependability, and they include
the institutional boundaries that enable the compartmentalization of risk.
Who
would tether a fully loaded 707 passenger jet to somebody’s experimental rocket
plane? Common sense and ordinary folk
wisdom are not rocket science. But to the politicians and mavens with the
hubris to think that a country’s economy can be “managed” by experts using
techniques and algorithms that even financial advisors can’t penetrate, common
sense might as well be the type I, types IIA and IIB, and heterotic SO(32) and E8XE8
superstring
theories of cosmological physics.
Without the profit incentive and the discipline of failure, government’s well-meaning ventures are usually expensive failures, frequently they are one-off gestures, and rarely are they free of malign unintended consequences. This is because government failures never punish those who engineered them. [Read my popular article, Legislative Malpractice, and weep - http://jaygaskill.com/CongressionMalpractice.htm .]
Government, especially at
its well-meaning best, breeds bureaucrats as fast as a warm pile of manure
breeds flies. And mindless bureaucracy (the phrase is a redundancy),
whether it infects banks, or regulatory agencies, or real estate sales agencies,
or congress or the executive branch, or investment firms, is the enemy of
creativity, individual judgment, and personal accountability. The fatal attraction of pyramid schemes (and
that was the housing market from 1988-2008) seduced both liberals and
conservatives alike. But only the naïve
liberals and complicit unthinking conservatives were reckless enough to entice
poor people into that game. Of course,
we need government, but we need insurance against its good intentions.
Spare
me the elites who can’t seem to understand why the ordinary people of this
country are angry at therm.
JBG
For
further reading, see The American Creative Surge, also by the
author, linked at http://www.jaygaskill.com/ACS2011.htm.
This
article, published on The Policy Think Site and its Linked blogs, is Copyright
© 2011 by Jay B. Gaskill, Attorney at Law, All rights Reserved.
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and links are welcome, with attribution. For all other permissions, your
comments and suggestions, contact the author via E-mail at law@jaygaskill.com.